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Este estudio presenta la primera base de datos de deuda pública compilada en forma sistemática para 
asegurar su comparabilidad a través de todos los países de las Américas. El estudio reporta además los 
principales hechos estilizados que surgen de esta base para los países en vías de desarrollo en el 
continente en las últimas dos décadas. Encontramos que los niveles de deuda pública (como % del 
PIB) en las economías emergentes de la región son similares a los de países desarrollados, y que estos 
niveles se han mantenido estables desde fines de los noventa. En contraste, encontramos cambios 
sustanciales en la composición de la deuda pública, desde deuda externa en monedas extranjeras a 
deuda doméstica en moneda local. Esta “desdolarización” y “domesticación” de la deuda pública no 
ha sido a costa de mayor deuda de corto plazo – contrario a lo que comúnmente se había creído. 
Además, encontramos que la fracción de la deuda pública emitida en el mercado local depende del 




In this paper, we introduce the first comprehensive database on sovereign debt systematically 
compiled to ensure comparability, for all countries in the Americas, and use this new data to highlight 
the main stylized facts regarding sovereign debt for developing America in the last two decades. We 
find that debt ratios in developing America are comparable to those in developed countries and have 
remained stable since the late nineties. By contrast, the composition of debt in the region has changed 
significantly, shifting from foreign currency external to local currency domestic debt. This 
“onshoring” and “dedollarization” of sovereign debt, contrary to conventional wisdom, has not come 
at the expense of a shortening of maturities. Furthermore, we find that “onshoring” is correlated with 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Some means should be resorted to for liquidating the public debt, and in this he agreed….that a great 
sacrifice should be made. … The sacrifice would be a temporary one, and with that view he would be 
willing to give up as large a share of his property as any other individual. By such means ought the evil of 
national debt be met. It was an evil which almost any sacrifice would not be too great to get rid of. It 
destroyed the equilibrium of prices, occasioned many persons to emigrate to other countries, in order to 
avoid the burthen of taxation which it entailed, and hung like a mill-stone round the exertion and industry 
of the country.  
David Ricardo, parliamentary speech, 1819. 
 
The effects of issuing public debt, both domestic and external have been the subject of substantial 
scrutiny and analysis. While Ricardian Equivalence indicates that the level of public debt should 
be a priori irrelevant for economic outcomes as consumers anticipate its effect on future taxes and 
adjust consumption accordingly (Barro, 1974), there are several arguments rooted in both the 
neoclassical and the Keynesian traditions that suggest that the level of public debt does matter.
1 In 
those cases, debt issuance would involve intertemporal transfers that may have sizable 
implications on aggregate demand and economic activity. A normative implication of this view is 
that debt should increase during recessions and shrink during expansions. 
After the debt crisis of the 1980s economists also started focusing their attention on the 
implications of external debt. Accessing international financial markets has been considered at 
times both as a bliss —as it opens up the availability of capital resources to capital scarce 
countries— and as a curse —to the extent that it exposes the borrowing country to an unstable 
financing environment (in particular, roll-over risk).
2 More recently, economists also started to 
focus on the currency composition of debt stocks. There is a growing consensus that the presence 
of a currency mismatch exposes the country to balance sheet effects in the event of real exchange 
rate adjustment. In addition, the anticipation of these effects may by itself trigger self-fulfilling 
currency or liquidity runs. This view has found empirical support in many studies that highlight 
the role played by currency mismatches in the run up to financial crises.
3 Lately a second 
                                                       
1 One possible reason is the presence of distortionary taxes, other reasons are due to the fact that agents 
may not fully anticipate the effects of future taxes or may use a higher rate to discount the future welfare of 
their offsprings. For a survey of possible exceptions to Ricardian Equivalence see Mankiw (2000). 
2  Volatility of capital flows is not sufficient to argue that international capital market access is harmful, but 
combined with moral hazard issues, self-fulfilling crises or asymmetric information it is possible to 
rationalize that integration to capital markets may reduce welfare.  
3 The implications of currency mismatches have been flagged by Krugman (1999), Aghion, Banerjee and 
Bacchetta (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), and Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), among   2
composition dimension, namely, the place of issuance, has started to gain importance in the 
policy discussion, particularly in light of the high correlation between currency and jurisdiction: 
unlike external debt, domestic debt is often denominated in the local currency, and increasingly 
so, which points at market imperfections as potential drivers of the high dollarization ratios 
exhibited by external debt.
4 Place of issuance,  has also been found to be of relevance regarding 
the fate of public debt in recent debt restructurings.
5  
Although economists have made important advances in developing theoretical models 
aimed at evaluating the impact of debt in both normal and crisis times, and in developing 
sophisticated techniques aimed at measuring debt sustainability, the empirical work has been 
hindered by the lack of a rich and comparable cross-country dataset on the level and composition 
of public debt. The most widely used sources of cross-country data on public debt are the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) published by the 
World Bank. Data on smaller set of countries are also available from the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) and from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). All these present several important drawbacks, however. 
First, most of them have incomplete coverage for developing countries and even for some 
large industrial economies.
6 In addition, the available data presents a serious comparability 
problem. In most cases official sources differ in how they report debt figures (which are then 
compiled in the larger datasets without the needed homogenization). Second, the items reported 
tend to differ across countries: sometimes, good coverage of external debt contrasts with little or 
no information on domestic debt; sometimes, only information on long-term debt is available; 
some countries differ in whether they refer to general government or central government debt,  
gross or net figures, whether or not they include the liabilities of the central bank and state-owned 
enterprises, etc. Third, the country’s liabilities may be significantly different according to whether 
                                                                                                                                                               
many others. Supporting empirical evidence is provided by Eichengreen et al (2003), Berganza and García 
Herrero (2003), Goldstein and Turner (2003), Calvo et al. (2003), and Levy Yeyati (2006). 
4 The argument that some degree of home bias combined with differential currency preferences between 
residents and non-residents may render the currency of denomination of debt “habitat-dependent” (more 
specifically, determined by the residence of the lender) is developed in Levy Yeyati (2004). This domestic-
external market distinction is in line with the evidence that past debt de-dollarization experiences have been 
driven by a deepening of the domestic markets (Bordo et al., 2002), and that the dollarization ratio of 
government bonds is negatively correlated with the size of domestic financial markets (Claessens et al., 
2003). 
5 The role of jurisdiction in sovereign debt litigation is reviewed in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005a, 
2006). 
6 In a recent effort,  Jaimovich and Panizza (2006) partially address this problem by reporting total 
sovereign debt figures for a large sample of countries and years, albeit based on heterogenous sources and 
definitions. No disaggregation is provided.   3
they have successfully privatized their social securities, reducing an important source of non-
documented, implicit debt. Finally, standard datasets provide little if not any information on the 
characteristics of the debt issued. Hence, there is scarce information on the currency of 
denomination or indexation mechanisms; whether the debt is external or domestic; if it is bonded, 
bank or official debt; and what share of the debt is short term. 
At any rate, the importance of counting with accurate measures of the level and 
composition of public debt cannot be overemphasized. The objective of this paper is twofold. On 
the one hand, to fulfill this information gap, we introduce the first comprehensive database on 
sovereign debt (henceforth, CLYPS), systematically compiled to ensure comparability, 
comprising all countries in the Americas.
7 On the other hand, we discuss the main stylized facts 
regarding sovereign debt for Latin America in the last two decades or so in light of this new 
information set. To the best of our knowledge the only other paper that provides information on 
the composition of public debt in a sample of emerging market countries is Jeanne and Guscina 
(2006). In particular, they focus on 19 emerging economies, of which 5 (Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) in Latin America and hence are also included in our dataset. 
Jeanne and Guscina (2006) also cover 7 Asian countries and 6 countries located in Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the sources used to compile the 
data and briefly discusses some methodological issues. Section 3 highlights major trends in level 
and composition of public debt in the Americas. In Section 4, the paper discusses the issue of 
debt dollarization in detail. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
  
2.  Methodological Issues and Sources 
 
A number of methodological choices were made in the construction of our database. The first one 
pertains to the levels of government to be considered. Specifically, whether subnational entities 
will be included in a consolidated total, whether and how central bank assets and liabilities should 
be handled, and whether the liabilities of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) should be added in the 
computation.  
Regarding the first aspect, we prefer to assume, conservatively, that subnational debt is 
not implicitly guaranteed by the sovereign and therefore should be excluded from the 
computation. It has to be noted, however, that in many instances (including recent episodes en the 
                                                       
7 Three non-American economies are also included for comparison: New Zealand, Pakistan and South 
Africa.    4
region) the central government assumed part or all of the subnational debt. Furthermore, several 
small countries in our sample do not have subnational entities and, as a result, their reported debt 
is comparable to that of the consolidated public sector in the standard case of a partially 
decentralized government. It follows, that comparing the federal government debt of a country 
without subnational levels of government with one with subnational governments may 
underestimate the debt burden of the latter relative to the former. In order to address this concern, 
data on subnational debt is also reported in the database.  
By contrast, we add central bank non-monetary liabilities to the final debt figure, 
particularly since a significant fraction of multilateral and external lending to the central 
government in developing economies is typically assumed directly by the Central Bank despite 
representing an outstanding obligation of the national authorities. Perhaps more controversially, 
we exclude —as virtually all countries do in their official debt statistics— short-term central bank 
obligations issued for the purpose of monetary regulation (although the line between financing 
and financing instruments is not always clear). Since for most practical purposes monetary 
liabilities are unlikely to be redeemed, we exclude them from the computation of public debt.  
Finally, we exclude from the analysis the liabilities of SOE (including public banks). We 
do this partly because SOE debt is not always guaranteed by the government, and partly because 
these liabilities are used (most of the time) to finance real assets of the SOE that can be seized by 
creditors in the event of default. Counting the liabilities without an equivalent assessment of the 
asset base (or, more generally, the net worth of the companies) would overstate the contingent 
liabilities of the public sector. 
The next important decision relates to whether gross or net debt stocks are the relevant 
debt measure. A key factor hampering cross–country comparability is the fact that some countries 
only report net debt that is, in addition, obtained following different netting strategies. To address 
this issue in a consistent way, we start with our definition of gross debt comprising the 
consolidate debt of the government (including  the Central Bank, as noted) and proceed to 
compute two alternative definitions of net debt (which we describe in detail in section 4). 
The final methodological decision relates to the definition of external and domestic debt. 
External debt is often identified as foreign-currency debt, whereas domestic debt is considered to 
be that issued in the local currency. In fact, some countries still report external and domestic debt 
according to this criterion. While the currency of denomination is a crucial aspect to be traced 
when assessing the debt burden and the credit risk of a country, currency denomination is an 
inaccurate indicator of external debt as countries have issued a considerable amount of foreign 
currency denominated debt in domestic markets and, more recently, domestic currency   5
denominated debt in international markets. An alternative approach sometimes used in the 
literature defines external debt as those liabilities held by non residents.
8 The resident-non 
resident distinction in some sense captures the underlying nature of the definition of external and 
domestic debt, in that it allows to better understand the income effects of changes in the debt 
stock, to assess the degree of international risk sharing and to measure the net foreign assets 
position of the country. However, it has at least two important drawbacks. The first one is 
conceptual: it ignores the legal aspects that separate both types of debt, to the extent that 
international courts enhance creditors’ rights relative to domestic markets in developing 
economies. The second one is practical: the distinction between debt held by resident and non-
resident is in practice virtually impossible to make. More precisely, while the data provide a clear 
measure of the investor base of bank loans, the holder composition is by definition impossible to 
track for bonded debt that is continuously traded in anonymous secondary markets. For these 
reasons, the distinction by holder, while theoretically relevant, is practically feasible only for 
countries where the stock of marketable debt is negligible. For these reasons, in this paper we 
classify debt according to the legal jurisdiction where debt has been issued. Accordingly, we 
define external liabilities as obligations issued under international (as opposed to domestic) Law. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this data-set, external debt comprises all liabilities issued in foreign 
jurisdictions, while domestic debt denotes debt under the rule of domestic courts. Thus, debt 
issued under New York Law would be domestic if the issuer is a U.S. resident and external 
otherwise, irrespective of the currency or the nationality of the holder. As noted, this distinction 
acknowledges the fact that different jurisdiction may be assigned different institutional quality, 
and thus differential credit risk for a given issuer.
9 
Based on these choices, we classify debt using the template shown in Table 1. This 
template distinguishes between external and domestic debt and classifies both instruments mainly 
into (non-marketable) bank loans and marketable instruments. In some cases, other specific items, 
such as suppliers’ credit, may show up depending on the peculiarities of each country. We 
classify these occasional items as “other debt”. Note that loans refer to debt issued as a loan by a 
financial institution, as opposed to marketable public debt held by financial institutions, which are 
                                                       
8 This is also the definition used in the External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users jointly 
published by the BIS, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, Paris Club, UNCTAD, and World Bank. In fact, on page 7, 
the guide states that “Gross external debt, at any given time, is the outstanding amount of those actual 
current, and not contingent, liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at 
some point(s) in the future and that are owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy.”  
9 Since the recent Argentina restructuring the same bonds were issued with both New York and Buenos 
Aires legislation, with the New York bonds trading at tighter spreads.  See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 
(2005b) for a comprehensive review of the differences in treatment for domestic and external debt in recent 
debt restructurings.    6
included as part of the stock of market instrument debt. The distinction reflects the difference in 
liquidity between these two debt instruments. Sometimes, however, this distinction is less than 
clear. In Argentina, for example, the November 2001 Phase 1 debt exchange transformed 
marketable debt into customized instruments named préstamos garantizados (guaranteed loans), 
which were technically loans (so that banks were able to book them at nominal value instead of 
marking them to market) but, as a new incarnation of bonded debt, were designed to be traded 
over-the-counter –which they did to a considerable degree. For this reason, we report them under 
marketable debt.  
Once the value for each debt type are computed, we look into its currency composition. 
In general, we classify debt into domestic and foreign currency denominated (we consider local 
currency debt indexed to the exchange rate as equivalent to the latter), although in some cases we 
report the share of CPI-indexed debt. We additionally classify debt according to its remaining 
maturity, where long-term denotes obligations with at least one year to maturity.   
Finally, we report data on interest rates, whenever a meaningful measure can be 
constructed. Interest rates are available for official lending, but rarely for other debt instruments. 
Average spreads on external dollar denominated debt as computed in the Emerging Market Bond 
Index (EMBI) are available only for the few countries that have issued marketable debt with 
sufficient liquidity, which comprises a limited number of country and years. We complete this 
information and compute a typical interest profile for marketable debt by choosing a 
representative instrument, typically the one with the largest trading volume in each year 
(according to data sourced from Bloomberg). All this implies that the interest rate series reported 
here have to be taken with caution. First, while the rate for official debt is an average rate (the 
implicit rate that the government is effectively paying), the interest rate on marketable debt 
represents an estimate of the marginal rate in the debt market. Furthermore, these rates 
correspond to debt stocks (or instruments) with duration that changes over time —a caveat that 
also affects the standard EMBI index. To highlight these considerations, we report not only the 
interest rate (both in domestic and foreign currency) but also the corresponding duration in each 
case. 
In building the data, we follow a systematic pecking order to select from the several 
sources at hand. We started with the information provided by the government, either in response 
to a survey specifically designed for this project, or in the form of statistical bulletins prepared by 
the finance ministry or the central bank. As a secondary source, as well as for the main 
consistency check regarding official lending, we resorted to data from multilateral organizations 
(World Bank, IMF and BIS). In addition, a number of publications by international investment   7
banks, specialized newspapers, and online information systems were tapped to fill in the gaps. 
Whenever different sources give conflicting numbers, we used local official sources as our 
preferred option, and total debt levels as the main variable to test overall consistency. 
Specifically, we looked at local official sources for (total) external and domestic debt stocks, and 
worked down from there to obtain the building blocks that add up to the aggregate stocks. As 
information on official debt presented discrepancies only very rarely, the main difficulty 
remained to obtain reliable data on marketable debt and bank loans. Here, we reconciled data 
from different sources and, when needed, the values were derived as residuals between two 
available lines. 
It is easy to illustrate the relevance of these many methodological choices in the final 
numbers. Consider Figure 1, which plots different measures of the debt-to-GDP ratio for Mexico.  
There are at least three sources (IFS, ECLAC, and the Mexican government’s “traditional” 
definition of debt) that provide a number for the debt ratio in 2004 of roughly 25 percent. By 
contrast, our data indicates a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 40 percent, and the Mexican 
“augmented” definition indicates a debt ratio of approximately 47 percent —the difference 
between these last two numbers is due to the fact that we do not include as sovereign obligations 
the debt issued by Mexican development banks and PIDIRIEGAS (infrastructure projects with 
deferred expense booking). In turn, the large differences with the IFS, ECLAC and “traditional” 
measure arise mostly from the way in which one treats the debt issued in 1995 to rescue the 
banking system after the 1994 crisis (note that all definitions are gross and thus do not differ in 
the netting procedure). 
Table 2 presents a brief comparison of country and year coverage in our dataset and that 
of the ECLAC, the main alternative source for the region, covering 15 countries, including all the 
large economies in the region.
10  By comparison, CLYPS covers 25 countries in both Latin 
America and the Caribbean (plus Canada and the United States, for a total of 27 countries) going 
back to the early 1990s in most cases (and the early 1980s for external debt), longer than ECLAC 
for all but four countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama), with only one country (Haiti) 
represented in ECLAC and not in CLYPS. 
Concerning the already noted scarcity of information on debt composition, CLYPS 
improves upon existing publicly available datasets by including the composition of public debt by 
currency, term, and type of lender. As indicated in column 3, there are 16 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries for which the database reports information on currency composition (these 
                                                       
10 IFS only covers 9 countries in the LAC region and does not report data for several large countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador).   8
are the countries for which currency composition is available for both domestic and external debt; 
there are another 7 countries for which the data on currency composition is limited to external 
debt) and 9 countries for which it reports data on the term structure. In addition, the data 




3.  Debt Level and Composition: Major Trends 
 
This section describes the evolution of the level and composition of debt in the Americas since 
the early 90s. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the Debt to GDP ratio in 22 Latin American and 
Caribbean (henceforth LAC) countries for which we have data over a long sample period (the 
figure does not include data for the Dominican Republic, which starts in 2002). If we look at 
simple averages (the dark bars), we find that debt ratios decreased rapidly in the early 1990s, 
bottomed out in 1997 and 1998, and started growing again to peak in 2003, at which point a new 
downward trend is insinuated. However, if we instead focus on median values (the narrow light 
bars), the dramatic ups and downs mostly disappear, reflecting the fact that the decline of the 
early 1990s and the rise in the late 90s was largely driven by events in a few highly indebted 
countries. This picture is confirmed by the weighted average debt ratio which shows a milder 
reduction in debt levels in the early 90s than the simple average (reflecting the fact that that the 
largest reductions were concentrated in a few small countries) and a substantial increase in the 
second half of the 90s, reflecting the incidence of a few large and highly indebted countries.
12  
It is interesting to compare the evolution of public debt in Latin America with that of the 
two industrial countries in the Western Hemisphere: Canada and the U.S.. Figure 3 shows that by 
1994/95 Latin American debt (as measured by the weighted average debt ratio) was below that of 
Canada and the US. However, Canadian and US debt decreased substantially during the second 
half of the 1990s (US debt started increasing again in 2000) at a time when LAC debt increased. 
                                                       
11 For all these categories, there are finer subdivisions. For instance, official debt is divided into bilateral 
and multilateral debt, and multilateral debt is divided into debt with the IMF, the World Bank, the IDB, and 
with other multilateral institutions. On the other hand, domestic bank and bonded debt can be separated 
from international bank and bonded debt.  
12 The weighted average corresponds to the ratio of aggregate debt over the aggregate. Note also that these 
numbers are somewhat influenced by the explosive debt ratios in Argentina after de 2002 devaluation: as 
can be seen in the figure, the weighted average ratio for a sample excluding Argentina (the black line) 
shows no visible differential behavior up until 2001, but diverges over the 2001-2004 period, remaining 
rerlatively stable since 1999.    9
As a consequence, by 2004 the average LAC debt was almost identical to that of the US and 4 
percentage points above that of Canada.  
The 22-country sample used to compute the averages reported in Figure 2 can be 
naturally divided into two groups of countries with distinct debt characteristics: (i) emerging 
economies with access to the international capital markets and a larger share of private (and, 
recently, bonded) debt; and (ii) countries with limited or no access to international markets that 
depend mostly official lending and, to a lesser extent, on captive domestic demand. With this in 
mind, we leave out the Bahamas (a high-income offshore center), and classify as emerging 
markets the eleven LAC countries included in J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index 
(EMBI) portfolio, and as non-emerging markets the remaining nine countries.
13 
 
Emerging market countries 
 
Emerging market countries are the largest in the region, so it is not surprising that the behavior of 
the weighted average of debt ratios for this subgroup of countries (both including and excluding 
Argentina) is basically identical to the weighted average of the whole sample of countries (as can 
be seen from a comparison of Figures 2 and 4). By contrast, the simple average of debt over 
GDP and its median value are lower than those of the whole sample. Again, however, we find a 
U-shaped evolution of the average debt ratio, which bottoms out in 1997 and grows steadily 
thereafter until 2004. 
  To better understand what is driving the debt to GDP ratios, Figure  5 splits the 
percentage changes in the Debt to GDP ratio into percentage changes in real GDP, the real 
exchange rate and the dollar value of debt. In the early 90s real growth and appreciating 
currencies helped bring debt to GDP ratios down in the EM subgroup. This lasted up to the time 
of the Asian crisis, after which growth slowed and currencies depreciated throughout the 
subgroup. Indeed, it is only in 2004 that (once again) real growth and appreciations contribute to 
bringing down the debt to GDP ratio once again. Changes in the amount of debt, in turn, explain 
all of the increase in debt ratios between 1995 and 1998 (largely due to rising stocks of debt in 
Mexico and Brazil). After  2000 the debt over GDP is strongly influenced by events in Argentina 
(falling output and a large depreciation of the currency). 
A cursory look at Table 3 and Figure 6, show that the subgroup averages discussed 
above hide wide differences across countries in both the level and evolution of debt. For a start, 
                                                       
13 IMF (2003) uses a classification similar to ours but includes Costa Rica in the sample of emerging 
market countries.   10
not all countries have U-shaped debt paths. Debt over GDP in Chile and Panama falls 
systematically during the period considered, while debt ratios in Ecuador and Mexico were 
heavily impacted by episodes of financial crises. Debt levels also differ considerably across 
countries in this subgroup. As of 2004, debt over GDP ranged from over 100% of GDP in 
Argentina and Uruguay, to below 40% of GDP in Venezuela and Mexico. 
Figure 7 describes the composition of total debt in EM countries according to the source 
of financing. It shows that the official and private external debt ratios remained stable at roughly 
10 percent and 15 percent of GDP. As a result, external debt exhibits no discernible trend (besides 
a slight U shape).  On the other hand, the increasing trend in debt documented in Figure 4 was 
almost entirely due to the growth of domestic debt ratios, which more than doubled from 16 
percent in 1994 to 37 percent in 2004. 
Figure 8 places the focus on external debt (for which the data goes back to 1983). On 
average, lending by the IMF and the other multi-laterals has hovered at slightly over 5 percent of 
GDP (or 20 percent of external debt, reaching 7.5 percent in 1987 and 8.2 percent in 2003), while 
bilateral lending steadily reduced it share from a peak of 6 percent of GDP in 1987 to the current 
level of about 2 percent of GDP. By contrast, debt ratios with private lenders reveals two clear 
patterns —not present in the previous figures due to the shorter time coverage. First, a dramatic 
shift in composition from bank to bonded debt in the aftermath of the debt crises of the 1980s, 
when international banks loans (which represented more than 90 percent of external debt at the 
time) were swapped into global bonds under the Brady plan. Second, a visible downward trend in 
external debt ratios, that halved the average figure from a peak of 30 percent in 1987 to 16 
percent of GDP in 2004 (bottoming out at about 12 percent in 1997), again explained to a large 
extent by the debt reduction associated with the Brady plan. 
As a result of a stable official external debt ratio and a declining private external debt 
ratio, total external debt ratios in the 1990s were on average below those in the 1980s and 
exhibited a larger official component, which contrast with the conventional view that 
international financial institutions have been increasingly dwarfed by growing cross-border 
capital flows to emerging economies —a proposition that may be qualified when we add FDI and 
private borrowing, but not when look at sovereign finance. Indeed, even when include the 
growing domestic debt stocks we still find that the official lending share have been stable at about 
14 percent of the total stock of total public debt since the late 1990s, with multilateral lending 
representing close to 12% of total debt by end-2004. These shares are even larger in non-
emerging economies, to which we turn next. 
   11
Countries with limited or no market access 
 
Overall, debt ratios for non-emerging market countries with limited or no access to the 
international capital markets have been remarkably stable at 60-70 percent. In contrast with 
emerging markets, the group appears to exhibit a declining trend in debt ratios (driven by official 
and, to a lesser extent private lending) that went from 80 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to 
60 percent in 1995 and remaining stable thereafter (Figure 9 and Table 3). Note that this trend is 
significantly deeper for the simple average debt ratio due to one small country (highly indebted 
Nicaragua, which benefited from a large reduction in official debt in the context of the HIPIC 
initiative), as reflected in the difference between the simple average (represented by the dark 
bars) and the median and the weighted average ratios (the dark area and the light bars, 
respectively) in the early period.  
Very much like the EM group, falling debt over GDP in the first half of the nineties was 
mostly due to real growth and appreciating currencies. Unlike the EM – however – in this 
subgroup this trend continued through to 2004, with the sole exception of 1999 (Figure 10) 
  Once again averages hide important differences across countries in the subgroup. Despite 
the overall downward trend, debt over GDP has gone up (and substantially so!) in Barbados, 
Belize, Jamaica and Paraguay. As of 2004 public debt was high in three countries of this 
subgroup (Belize, Jamaica and Nicaragua).  
Figure 11 describes the evolution of external debt in the subgroup in more detail. In 
particular, it shows that the big decline in the early 90s was associated with a sharp reduction in 
bilateral debt stocks, which went from 39 percent of total debt in 1990 to a mere 7 percent in 
2004. On the other hand, external debt due to private creditors hovered at around 8 percent of 
GDP, and multilateral debt ranged between 16 and 20 percent. As noted, for this group the 
participation of multilateral lending in sovereign finance has been historically larger than for 




Figure 12 shows the composition of debt by currency for the emerging countries for which we 
have complete data for the last ten years. Although the (weighted average) of foreign currency 
debt increased from 24 percent of GDP in 1996 to 29 percent in 2004, its share in total debt 
dropped from 52 to 44 percent due to the growing share of domestic debt, typically denominated 
in the local currency. Interestingly, whereas foreign currency debt represent close to 100 percent   12
of external obligations for the group, it is marginal in most domestic markets (the average peaked 
at only 9 percent in 2001). This provides a stark illustration of the link between location (in turn, 
related with the residence of the lender) and currency denomination that have been highlighted in 
the literature (see footnote 4). In this particular case, this was reflected, primarily, in a decline in 
the dollar share of total debt that was the result of lower external dollar debt ratios that were more 
than compensated by an increase in local currency denominated domestic debt, both indexed to 
the local CPI (which more than doubled over the 1996-2004 period to reach 6 percent of GDP) 
and nominal (which went from 20 percent of GDP in 1996 to 30 percent of GDP in 2004). In 
addition, recent years witnessed some international issues in domestic currency which, at less 
than 1 percent of GDP, suggest that the lack of local currency external debt, rather than inability 
to borrow, reflected the unwillingness to pay a higher currency premium than in domestic 
markets. 
Note, however, that onshoring of public debt is not in all cases a panacea for  reducing 
overall dollarization, as domestic dollarization of public debt remains significant in Argentina and 
Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Peru and Colombia (Table 4). 
Another aspect of financial vulnerability that has received considerable attention in the 
literature is the maturity of debt, particularly in relation with local currency debt subject to 
nominal risk. We report data on the maturity of domestic debt in the last column of Table 4. The 
conventional view is that de-dollarization in the region may have come at the expense of 
increased reliance on short term debt, as dollarization and short-termism are both ways of coping 
with aggregate price risk (De La Torre and Schmuckler,  2005). To explore this view, Figure 13 
combines the share of short term debt and foreign currency domestic debt, and plots the path of 
this overall “risk exposure” over time for the small sample of countries in which both variables 
are available. Interestingly, with the exception of Brazil, the conventional wisdom view is not 
validated in the data. 
In sum debt composition display two important trends that have only deepened in recent 
years: on the one hand, debt onshoring (that is, the gradual substitution of domestic for external 
debt) and dedollarization (possibly as the results of the general preference for the home currency 
exhibited by financial markets). 
 
4.   Netting 
 
Countries with similar debt ratios but different stocks of liquid public assets are not strictly 
comparable from the perspective of debt sustainability. The distinction pertains not only to the   13
holdings of international reserves, but also to the treatment of cross-holdings of public paper by 
separate public entities, and between national and sub-national governments. Hence, the 
relevance of a clear definition of net debt for cross-country comparisons. 
There are at least three important items that could be netted out of the gross debt stocks 
reported above, which in turn correspond to public entities that may or may not be consolidated 
within the public sector for the purposes of public debt accounting. 
The first one is the group of SOEs, which includes state-owned banks as a particular case. 
As noted, we chose to exclude SOEs  as a second best course of action in the absence of a good 
valuation of the SOE’s non-financial assets.
14 Notice that this may not entail a problem for the 
case of a public bank, where non-financial items represent a minor part of the balance sheet. 
However, rather than netting out public bank holdings of government debt, consolidating the 
financial public sector would imply —much in the same way as we do with the central bank— 
adding the net liability position of public banks vis à vis the private sector. While we believe this 
goes beyond the traditional concept of sovereign debt, the exercises can be readily done based on 
the (often publicly available) balance sheet data of public banks.  
The second big item concerning net debt is the cross holding of government debt by the 
Central Bank, is somewhat less controversial. A first correction is readily motivated by the 
inclusion of long-run central bank obligations within the public debt figure: central bank holdings 
of government paper should be netted out of the total. Central Bank holdings of government debt 
can, in principle, be broken down into “marketable” debt —government paper held permanently 
or transitorily by the Central Bank— and “non marketable debt” —instruments in the domestic 
credit account issued by the government as the counterpart of the monetary base. In consolidating 
the central bank with the non-financial public sector, it seems appropriate only to net the 
marketable debt excluding both domestic credit instruments and the monetary liabilities of the 
Central Bank, as they are unlikely to be redeemed. As noted earlier, we also leave out short-term 
central bank obligations issued for the purpose of monetary regulation. We keep track of this 
revised debt variable denoting it as net debt 1. In addition, we net out international reserves 
(again, in line with most official statistics) to obtain our preferred definition of net debt (net debt 
2).
15   
                                                       
14 In line with this, our gross debt figures included debt issued by the Central Bank but not debt issued by 
state-owned banks. 
15 Note that an increase in money demand that leads to reserve accumulation shows up as a reduction in net 
debt 2. This is correct to the extent that the demand shock is persistent and monetization leads to an 
increase in the net asset position of the government.   14




(1) Domestic Credit  (4) Monetary Base 
(2) International Reserves  Debt Issued by Central Bank 
(3) Marketable Domestic Debt    (5) Regular Bonds &  int. borrowing 
    (6) Bonds issued for monetary regulation 
NET DEBT 1 = Gross debt  – (3)   
NET DEBT 2 = Gross debt  – (2) – (3)   
 
 
  The third and most controversial item relates to social security reform, and recognizes the 
fact that the transition from a public pay-as-you-go pension (PYG) system to a private fully 
funded private capitalization (FFP) system had an important effect on both the level of public 
debt and the amount of future liabilities facing the government. Because the reduction in implicit 
liabilities comes hand in hand with the issuing of new debt instruments to finance the transition 
phase of the reform, focusing on only one aspect provides a distorted view of the debt burden 
across countries.
16 On the other hand, the actual value of implicit liabilities is virtually impossible 
to assess because since the government preserves the option to alter them by introducing legal 
changes (such as reducing benefits or tighter eligibility conditions or bailing out certain groups 
increasing their benefits). Bearing this caveat in mind, the fact that countries that privatized their 
social security saw their debt ratios increase as a result cannot be ignored, particularly in Latin 
America where the pension reform trend of the 90s was most prominent.  
An example helps illustrate the point. When Chile privatized its social security system it 
gave workers the option to remain in the old PYG system, or move to the new system. Those 
moving where granted the so-called “Bonos de Reconocimiento” to document their past 
contributions to the old system. For this group of workers the reform should be neutral for the 
level of public debt: the “Bonos de Reconocimiento” are simply making an implicit liability 
explicit. However, gross debt measures show a sizable increase, due the issuance of the “Bonos 
de Reconocimiento” at the time of the reform. It follows that subtracting these bonds is a sensible 
                                                       
16 More precisely, as the largest part of social security contributions were lost to pension funds, the 
government financed the resulting financing gap through the placement of government debt (in no small 
amount with the very pension funds that collected the contributions).   15
way to correct for what would otherwise be an overstatement of the debt position of the 
government.  
Unfortunately, in most cases the reduction in the flow costs of the pay-as-you-go system 
brought about by privatization (alternatively, the annual growth in implicit social security 
obligations under the old system) are far more difficult to evaluate. One crude way to tackle this 
problem is to assume that the stock accumulated in pension funds equals the reduction in implicit 
social security liabilities due to the reform. We follow this approach for our third definition of net 
debt, net debt 3 = net debt 2 – Pension Fund assets. This, in essence, extends the Chilean example 
to the more complex cases where the correspondence between pension fund savings and 
government reduced obligations is not so clear. Thus, if the government financed the revenue 
shortfall during the transition to the new pension system by placing new debt with pension funds, 
the reform would not be reflected in net debt figures. Alternatively, if the shortfall were financed 
via a higher fiscal effort (e.g., a tax hike), there would be a decline in net debt, as the government 
pre-pays a fraction of their future liabilities. This said, the solution proposed here is based on very 
strong assumptions. First, this method is implicitly assuming that private contribution rates were 
set in such a way that replacement rates in the FFP are the same as in the old PYG system. In 
addition, this assumption implies that if return on pension funds exceeds projected returns then 
this procedure would overstate the reduction in liabilities (and hence understate net debt). Second, 
as noted, implicit pension obligations are easier to dilute and less exposed to currency risk (as 
they are implicitly indexed to real wages).
17 
Table 5 and Figure 14 report debt over GDP for 2004 according to the three different net debt 
definitions discussed above. The first thing to note is that  the cross holdings of debt between the 
Central Bank and the Central Government are rare in Latin America and the Caribbean – so that 
Gross Debt and net debt 1 are in most cases identical. Chile and Argentina are exceptions, the 
first with significant cross holdings originating in the bank bailout of the early 80s, the latter from 
cross obligations between government jurisdictions arising from the 2001 crisis. Reserves, on the 
other hand, are sizeable throughout the region (11% for the weighted average, 13% for the simple 
average) so that there is a significant difference between gross and net debt 2. Indeed, as Figure 
15 shows, this difference has increased over time from about 7 percentage points in the early 
1990s. 
                                                       
17 On the other hand, casual evidence indicates that local pension fund managers typically display longer 
investment horizons, and a preference for local currency assets as they represent a natural hedge for their 
future beneficiaries (Levy Yeyati, 2004), which implies that debt with pension funds may benefit from 
lower roll-over and currency risks.    16
The divergence between gross debt and net debt 3 is even more dramatic, reflecting the 
evolution of pension reform in many LAC countries. While in the early 1990s pension funds 
assets were negligible, by 2004 they amounted to 7 percent of the region’s GDP, widening the 
gap between gross debt and net debt 3 to almost 20 percentage points by 2004. Cross country 
variations in the size of pension fund assets in 2004 largely reflect the timing of reforms. In Chile, 
the earliest reformer, pension fund assets are above 65% of GDP in 2004. Later reformers have 
stocks of accumulated assets that vary between 18% (Bolivia) and 6% (Mexico). As can be seen, 
there are two countries for which this measure of net debt actually takes a negative value: 
Trinidad and Tobago, which is characterized by low debt and large international reserves, and 
Chile, with low debt and large pension fund savings. More generally, the difference between 
gross and net debt is important in most countries in the sample.  
 
 
5.  Dollarization of  Public Debt in The Americas 
 
As discussed in the introduction, currency mismatches have drawn increasing attention in 
recent years – in particular after the financial crises in Mexico 1995, Asia 1997 and Argentina 
2001. Despite substantial theoretical work on this issue – and abundant evidence on dollarization 
in the private sector – the level and determinants of dollarization in the public sector has remained 
relatively unexplored due to lack of data. Furthermore, as the last column of Table 4 shows,  
overall vulnerability of public debt to real exchange rate shocks (as measured by total foreign 
currency public debt over GDP) remains high in several countries in the region, in particular in 
Argentina, Nicaragua and Uruguay. With this in mind this section reports a series of stylized facts 
that shed light on the determinants of public debt dollarization in the Americas. 
There is a strong link between location and currency. Whereas by end-2004 virtually all 
external debt was foreign currency denominated, a vast majority of domestic debt is issued in the 
local currency, of which the largest part is in nominal pesos. Note that this applies to all countries 
irrespective of their levels of development (including developed Canada and, to the extent that all 
sovereign debt is domestically denominated, also to the U.S.). Hence a first dimension to consider 
is the domestic and external shares of debt (Figure 16). In seven countries domestic debt 
accounts for more than half of total gross debt, the highest domestic share corresponding to Chile 
(close to 80 percent). At the other end of the distribution, less than 20% of total debt is domestic 
in Belize, Paraguay and Honduras. 
Note that this difference is not driven by differential access to international markets 
(which the latter countries do not have) but rather by the degree of development of domestic ones.   17
Indeed, all US public debt is domestically issued, and the domestic share of Canada is 
comparable with the Chilean one and clearly above the region’s average. 
Figures 17 and 18 look deeper into this crucial aspect, plotting the share of domestic debt 
in total public debt in 2004 against overall economic development (as measured by per capita 
GDP at PPP) and the size of the economy (as measured by GDP in nominal dollars). In both cases 
the figures show conditional correlations, that is, the impact of each variable on the share of 
domestic debt after controlling for the other variable. The OLS regressions behind figures 14 and 
15 are shown in Table 6.  As the table shows, these results are also robust to restricting our 
sample to Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
There is a positive and significant association between overall development and domestic 
to total debt ratios. A likely explanation is that per capita GDP is correlated with rule of law and 
institutional development, limiting the advantage of issuing offshore where debt falls under 
foreign jurisdiction. The size of the domestic financial market – also positively correlated with 
per capita GDP is also a possible explanation for this finding. Governments find it easier to 
finance their deficit domestically if there are well developed markets for debt and large banking 
sectors.  
Interestingly, there is also a positive association  between the overall size of the economy 
and the share of domestic public debt (Figure 18), pointing at the incidence of fixed cost in the 
functioning of financial markets, and to the relevance of liquidity —which requires both a large 
investor base and a large stock of instruments. Pension reforms entail a move in that direction. In 
addition to pushing up the stock of public debt during the transition phase, they create a “captive 
market” for public debt. In most cases, offshore investment by pension funds is severely 
restricted, while domestic investment is usually limited to a set of low risk assets. With this in 
mind, the last column of Table 6 includes the share of pension fund assets over GDP as 
additional determinant of the domestic share of public debt. As shown in the table – and despite 
our small sample size – we find a significant positive effect of pension assets on the share of 
domestic public debt. 
The second key dimension for overall dollarization is the share of domestic debt in 
foreign currency. As reported above, despite the fact that domestic debt is always less dollarized 
than foreign debt, there are countries in the region where dollarization of domestic debt is 
significant. There is a sizeable recent literature that has explored the determinants of dollarization 
in the domestic banking system.
18 Broadly speaking, this literature argues that a substantial share 
of dollarization can be seen as a privately rational response of borrowers and depositors to the   18
relative risks of local currency and dollar denominated debt contracts. In those countries in which 
local currency debt is risky (because of expectations of high and volatile inflation), agents prefer 
the dollar denominated alternatives. 
A simple way of seeing whether these mechanisms carry through to public debt is to 
compare bank dollarization with the degree of dollarization in domestic public debt in 2001. As 
Figure 19 shows, the correlation is indeed high. Indeed, a simple OLS regression of the 
dollarization of public debt on bank dollarization for 2001 gives an R2 of 0.5, and a coefficient of 
0.65 (significant at 1%). Moreover, R2 rises to 0.6 when Brazil and Colombia – countries which 
severely restrict banking dollarization are excluded. One possible interpretation of these results is 
that the same macroeconomic factors driving dollarization of private contracts are also driving 
dollarization of public debt in the region. It remains to be seen, therefore, if the forced de-
dollarization that has taken place in Argentina after default (and that has pushed the share of 
domestic dollar debt down from close to 80% in 2001 to the current levels) is sustainable in time. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
 
The main findings revealed by the new debt dataset introduced in this paper can be summarized 
as follows: 
•  Debt ratios in the developing America are comparable with ratios in developed countries  and 
remained at the same 60 percent levels that they had at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, 
they have remained remarkably stable since 1999. 
•  These regional averages hide large cross country differences in both the level and trends of 
public debt. On the one extreme, countries such  as Chile, Panama and Nicaragua have seen 
their debt decline steadily in the period covered by the database. At the other extreme, 
countries like Belize, Colombia and Jamaica have seen their public debt rise throughout most 
of the period. 
•  Where debt ratios have fallen, this has largely been the result of positive growth and 
appreciating currencies – rather than a reduction of the stock of outstanding debt. This was 
particularly true in the early 1990s. 
•  Macroeconomic crises have played an important role in the evolution of the ratio of public to 
GDP in the Americas – either through changes in the dollar value of the debt (as in the debt 
haircuts of Argentina  and Ecuador or the fiscal costs of the bank bailout in Mexico in 1995) 
and through the valuation effects of large depreciations. 
                                                                                                                                                               
18 See Levy Yeyati (2006) for a recent survey.    19
•  In contrast to the stable average stocks of debt, the composition of these debt stocks (by 
lender, currency and location) have changed visibly over the last 15 years. 
•  By lender: private lending shifted from bank- to bond-based (private lending), while official 
lending moved from bilateral to multilateral. On the other hand, in contrast with the 
conventional view that booming international markets have dwarfed the economic 
importance of multilateral financial institutions, the latter continue to be an economically 
important source of finance across the region. 
•  By place of issuance: the incidence of domestically issued debt has increased remarkably 
over the last decade, accounting for most of the growth in debt ratios.   
•  By currency: the region has exhibited a strong dedollarization trend in recent years, largely as 
a result of the growing reliance on domestic markets. Indeed, the evidence presented here 
also confirms the link between currency and location previously highlighted in the literature: 
domestically issued debt has been primarily (and increasingly) denominated in the local 
currency, while external debt has been almost entirely issued in a foreign currency. 
•  A common concern has been that dedollarization in the region has come at the expense of a 
higher share of short term debt. Although data on maturity is relatively limited, this paper 
shows that this concern is generally not valid – dedollarization has often not come at the 
expense of lower maturities. 
•  Regarding cross-country differences in onshoring, we find that: (i) the share of public debt 
issued domestically is positively related to per-capita-income (a broad measure of economic 
and institutional development), to the economic size of the country (associated economies of 
scale and, specifically, market liquidity), and to the presence of institutional investors 
(proxied by the stock of private pension funds assets). 
•  Finally, we find a high correlation between the dollarization of deposits (and loans) in the 
banking system and the dollarization of public debt, which suggests that the same factors 
explaining banking dollarization –mainly a lack of trust in the stability of the purchasing 
power of the local currency– are also driving debt dollarization. 
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Table 2: CLYPS versus ECLAC Coverage
Total Debt
from












Argentina 1994 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1994 - 2004 1997 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1994 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 1994 - 2004 -
Bahamas - 1990 - 2004 1997 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 1997 - 2004 -
Barbados - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004
Belize - 1990 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 - -
Bolivia 1993 - 2004 1991 - 2004 1991 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1991 - 2004 1988 - 2004 -
Brazil 1991 - 2004 1991 - 2004 1994 - 2004 2001 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1997 - 2004 1991 - 2004 1994 - 2004 2001 - 2004
Canada - 1994 - 2004 - - 1994 - 2004 - - 1994 - 2004 - -
Chile 1990 - 2004 1989 - 2004 1989 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1989 - 2004 1989 - 2004 -
Colombia 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1995 - 2004 1995 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1995 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1995 - 2004 1995 - 2004
Costa Rica 1991 - 2004 1984 - 2004 1991 - 2004 1999 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1984 - 2004 1991 - 2004 -
Dom. Rep. - 2002 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 2002 - 2004 - -
Ecuador 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 - - 1990 - 2004 - -
El Salvador 1993 - 2004 1990 - 2004 - 2001 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 - 2001 - 2004
Guatemala 1990 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 - -
G u y a n  ----------
Haiti 1996 - 2004 - - - - - - - - -
Honduras 2000 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 -
Jamaica - 1980 - 2004 1996 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1996 - 2004 -
Mexico 1990 - 2004 1982 - 2004 1989 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1982 - 2004 1982 - 2004 1982 - 2004 1982 - 2004 1989 - 2004 1990 - 2004
Nicaragua 1994 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1994 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1994 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004
Panama 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 1990 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1990 - 2004 -
Paraguay 1995 - 2004 1990 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1990 - 2004 - -
Peru 1998 - 2004 1991 - 2004 1992 - 2004 1992 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1998 - 2004 1991 - 2004 1992 - 2004 1998 - 2004
Trin. & Tob. - 1980 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 - -
United States - 1980 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 - - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 -
Uruguay - 1980 - 2004 1996 - 2004 1999 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1999 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1996 - 2004 1999 - 2004
Venezuela - 1980 - 2004 1996 - 2004 - 1980 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1997 - 2004 1980 - 2004 1996 - 2004 -
Country Total Debt CLYPS External Debt CLYPS Domestic Debt CLYPS
Country Mean Max Min Min Year 2004 1991 2004/ min
Argentina 0.60 1.43 0.29 1994 1.30 0.46 4.48
Brazil 0.66 0.89 0.37 1995 0.81 0.66 2.19
Colombia 0.41 0.66 0.26 1994 0.63 0.33 2.42
El Salvador 0.48 0.60 0.34 1999 0.45 0.59 1.32
Peru 0.54 0.78 0.39 1997 0.46 0.76 1.18
Uruguay 0.59 1.24 0.36 1996 1.19 0.44 3.31
Venezuela 0.45 0.64 0.27 2000 0.39 0.62 1.44
Chile 0.70 1.07 0.48 2004 0.48 0.99 1.00
Panama 0.84 1.27 0.65 1998 0.72 1.18 1.11
Ecuador 0.79 1.18 0.49 2004 0.49 1.09 1.00
Mexico 0.43 0.57 0.31 1994 0.38 0.44 1.23
Costa Rica 0.59 0.83 0.54 1993 0.58 0.69 1.07
Guatemala 0.23 0.42 0.17 1998 0.21 0.33 1.24
Honduras 1.00 1.29 0.79 2001 0.85 1.14 1.08
Nicaragua 3.38 6.85 1.76 2004 1.76 5.98 1.00
Trinidad & Tobago 0.48 0.67 0.25 2004 0.25 0.60 1.00
Barbados (1) 0.66 0.78 0.55 1991 0.77 0.58
Belize 0.58 0.94 0.44 1994 0.94 0.46 2.14
Jamaica 1.05 1.52 0.72 1994 1.42 0.90 1.97
Paraguay 0.32 0.52 0.20 1997 0.42 0.29 2.10
Bolivia 0.72 0.80 0.64 1997 0.74 0.80 1.16 U Shape
(1) 2004
Table 3: Summary Debt Statistics









































Country Total External Domestic Debt (% GDP)
Argentina 0.76 1.00 0.39 0.99 .
Bahamas 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.05 .
Barbados 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.23 0.26
Bolivia 0.91 1.00 0.70 0.68 .
Brazil 0.35 1.00 0.05 0.28 0.47
Chile 0.24 1.00 0.14 0.11 .
Colombia 0.58 1.00 0.26 0.36 0.01
Costa Rica 0.53 1.00 0.27 0.31 .
Honduras 0.82 1.00 0.06 0.69 .
Jamaica 0.51 1.00 0.17 0.73 .
Mexico 0.31 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.23
Nicaragua 0.68 0.99 0.00 1.20 0.00
Peru 0.85 1.00 0.26 0.39 0.10
Uruguay 0.90 0.96 0.74 1.07 0.12
Venezuela 0.66 1.00 0.04 0.26 .
Average Sample (weighted) 0.46 1.00 0.13 0.29 0.34
Average 0.56 1.00 0.22 0.52 0.17
Share of Short 
Term Debt
Share of Foreign Currency Debt:
Table 4: Currency and Maturity Composition of  Debt 2004  25
Country
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Argentina 1.31 1.23 1.11 0.99
Bahamas 0.37                
Barbados 0.73
Belize 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.89
Bolivia 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.46
Brazil 0.81 0.80 0.72 0.72
Chile 0.48 0.43 0.26 -0.39
Colombia 0.63 0.63 0.49 0.38
Costa Rica 0.58 0.58 0.48 0.48
Dominican Republic 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.47
Ecuador 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.45
El Salvador 0.46 0.46 0.34 0.20
Guatemala 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.07
Honduras 0.85 0.85 0.59 0.59
Jamaica 1.42 1.26 1.06 1.06
Mexico 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.23
Nicaragua 1.76 1.76 1.61 1.61
Panama 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.63
Paraguay 0.42 0.42 0.26 0.26
Peru 0.46 0.46 0.28 0.18
Trinidad & Tobago 0.25 0.25 -0.02 -0.02
Uruguay 1.19 1.08 0.88 0.74
Venezuela 0.39 0.39 0.22 0.22
Average Sample 0.70 0.69 0.56 0.49
Average Sample (weight 0.62 0.61 0.50 0.43
Canada 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.55
United States 0.63 0.37 0.36 0.36
Debt as a share of GDP
Table 5: Gross and Net Debt 2004





Net of Cross 
Holdings
Net of Cross 
Holdings and 
Reserves  26
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample LAC Full Sample
Intercept -0.377 ** -1.93 *** -1.454 *** -1.432 ** -1.406 ***
(0.17) (0.32) (0.36) (0.68) (0.37)
log(GDP) 0.081 *** 0.057 *** 0.058 *** 0.061 ***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log(per capita GDP ) 0.271 *** 0.148 *** 0.144 * 0.134 **
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Pension fund assets / GDP 0.369 *
(0.20)
N 2 72 52 52 12 4
R-sq 0.41 0.53 0.63 0.45 0.69
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: Domestic Public Debt / Total Public Debt 2004
Table  6: Determinants of Domestic Debt
This table reports a OLS regresion of the share of domestic issued debt in total public debt in 2004. GDP is nominal GDP in US dollars in 2004,
per capita GDP is valued at 2004 PPP. Pension fund assets are the total stock of assets administered by pension funds over nominal GDP. All
regressions (except column 4) include the full CLYPS sample of countries, and therefore incorporate Canada, US, New Zeland, South Africa























































































































1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
DEBT/GDP (W. AV. )
DEBT/GDP (AV. )
DEBT/GDP (MED)
DEBT/GDP (W. AV. NO ARG)
Countries Included: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 






























LAC is the weighted average of: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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% var real exchange rate
% var real gdp
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Domestic
External due to Private Creditors
External due to Official Creditors
Countries Included: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 















Countries Included: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.   31
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DEBT/GDP (W. AV. )
Countries Included: Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay. 
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% var totaldebt over gdp  32
 
 















Countries Included: Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay. 
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Graphs by Country
Currency Maturity Trade-Off  34
 
 
Figure 14: Gross and Net Debt Over GDP 2004
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Figure 16: Ratio of Domestic to Total Debt 2004
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